Eighty-six EU policy options for reducing imported deforestation by Bager, Simon L. et al.
Eighty-six EU policy options for reducing imported deforestation
Downloaded from: https://research.chalmers.se, 2021-08-31 11:35 UTC
Citation for the original published paper (version of record):
Bager, S., Persson, M., dos Reis, T. (2021)
Eighty-six EU policy options for reducing imported deforestation
One Earth, 4(2): 289-306
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.01.011
N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.
research.chalmers.se offers the possibility of retrieving research publications produced at Chalmers University of Technology.
It covers all kind of research output: articles, dissertations, conference papers, reports etc. since 2004.
research.chalmers.se is administrated and maintained by Chalmers Library
(article starts on next page)




















…protect existing forests to...
… cooperation with 
stakeholders to...
… provide market-based





… regulate stakeholders 
to...
… provide information to 
stakeholders to...
STAKEHOLDERS
THEORY OF CHANGE OUTCOME
Producers
Producer governments






Demand side action: 






EU policy options to reduce tropical deforestation driven by production of forest-risk commodities (FRCs)Highlightsd From 1,141 proposals, we identify 86 EU policy options for
reducing deforestation
d We assess the political feasibility to identify policy barriers
d Many policy options lack a proven theory of change for
reducing deforestation
d We identify a trade-off between political feasibility and
potential policy impactBager et al., 2021, One Earth 4, 289–306
February 19, 2021 ª 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier I
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.01.011Authors
Simon L. Bager, U. Martin Persson,





Images of distressed orangutans in
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.01.011SCIENCE FOR SOCIETY Images of distressed orangutans in Indonesia and forest fires in Brazil have
increased public awareness of deforestation across the globe. Still, deforestation continues more or less
unabated, driven by demand for forest-risk commodities, such as palm, soy, cocoa, and beef. What can
the European Union (EU) and other consumer regions do to address this problem? Here we present 86 pol-
icy options for the EU to address tropical deforestation, identified through a review of gray literature and EU
stakeholder consultation responses. Analyzing these, we show that policy options that are politically
feasible policies tend to have a weaker theory of change—the causal chain through which the policies
address deforestation—setting up a trade-off between feasibility and impact. However, there are excep-
tions, such as mandatory due diligence, which show potential impact and appear politically feasible.
Through policy mixing and working with key stakeholders, supply chains, and producer regions, these bar-
riers can be overcome.SUMMARYDespite the importance of tropical forest conservation in achieving global sustainability goals and the key role
of forest-risk commodity trade in driving deforestation, consumer country policy options for reducing im-
ported deforestation have received limited scholarly attention. Drawing on gray literature and a European
Commission public consultation, we identify 86 policy options for the European Union to address deforesta-
tion. We assess the political feasibility and map the ‘‘theory of change’’ (TOC)—the causal chain through
which the policies address deforestation—for each of these policy options, identifying a trade-off between
feasibility and potential impacts: information-based and cooperative policies, which dominate our sample,
typically exhibit high feasibility, but mostly lack convincing TOCs, while more stringent regulatory and mar-
ket-based policy options generally have lower feasibility. We propose three principles for overcoming the
feasibility-impact dilemma: (1) build policies on proven TOCs, (2) use policy mixes, and (3) work with key
stakeholders, supply chains, and regions.INTRODUCTION
About 200 million hectares of forests—just under a tenth of
the total forest area—have been lost across the tropics since
the turn of the century,1 and even greater areas have been
degraded.2 As a result, deforestation is the second-largest
source of greenhouse gas emissions, after fossil fuels,2 and
the primary driver of terrestrial biodiversity loss.3 The forest
fires in Brazil,4,5 which were particularly critical in 2019–
2020, have again put the spotlight on the plight of tropical
deforestation, increasing public awareness of this issue
across the world.One Earth 4, 289–306, Febr
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NProtecting the remaining tropical forests is key to meeting
several of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs),6 as tropical forests, among other ecosystem services,
provide climate mitigation, water circulation, climate regulation,
biodiversity protection, and livelihood support. Several interna-
tional agreements aim to reduce deforestation, from SDG target
15.2 to ‘‘halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and sub-
stantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally’’ to
the New York Declaration on Forests and the Paris Agreement.
Unfortunately, none of these pledges are on track to be met.7
Despite public and private conservation efforts, tropical defor-




















Figure 1. Deforestation risk and associated carbon emissions for
EU imports of agricultural and forestry commodities in the period
2015–2017
FRCs imported into the EU carry a deforestation risk. Using data from Pendrill
et al.,13 we calculated the total deforestation risk and associated carbon
emissions of EU imports of agricultural and forestry FRCs in the period 2015–
2017. Colors denote different commodities, while the hue indicates origin (see
legend to the right). Light gray indicates all FRCs and regions not explicitly
mentioned.
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OPEN ACCESS Articledeforestation frontiers are opening in Africa and parts of Latin
America previously spared from deforestation.7,8
Production of forest and agricultural commodities is the main
driver of deforestation across the tropics. Expanding cropland,
pasture, and forest plantations account for approximately 60%
of total forest loss.9 This expansion is, in turn, driven by
increased demand for forest-risk commodities (FRCs) from con-
sumers in rapidly growing urban areas in the countries of produc-
tion and international markets.10
The European Union (EU) is among the leading international
consumers of deforestation embodied in trade,11 due to limited
production of most FRCs, high per-capita consumption levels,
and the presence of large food and feed industries.12 From
2015 to 2017, EU imports of FRCs were associated with an esti-
mated annual deforestation risk of 190,000 ha.13 This embodied
deforestation was largely due to the import of palm oil, soybeans,
forest products, cocoa, and coffee from a handful of countries
(Figure 1). For some FRCs, EU imports constitute a large share
of the global trade, especially cocoa and coffee, of which the
EU imports more than 50% of global production, but also beef,
rubber, palm oil, soy, and wood pulp.12 Although the EU’s rela-
tive import share of many FRCs has declined in recent years—
in part due to growing demand by the Asian market, especially
China—EU imports have been increasing in absolute numbers.12
The EU does not have direct regulatory competence on forests
and currently no EU policy specifically addresses deforestation
caused by FRCs.14 Deforestation is only partially covered
through the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR), the Forest Law
Enforcement and Governance (FLEGT) Action Plan and related
voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) with producer coun-
tries, which aim to reduce imports of illegally harvested wood.
The Renewable Energy and Indirect Land Use Change Directives
indirectly address deforestation by targeting the deforestation
risk associated with EU bioenergy demand. The EU also sup-290 One Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021ports efforts to address deforestation through REDD+ (reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) activities.
There is, however, an ongoing process to formulate a defores-
tation-specific EU policy. This process began in 2008, when the
European Commission’s (EC) first communication on deforesta-
tion was adopted,15 guiding the ECs efforts, though not consti-
tuting an official mandate to act. This was followed by
studies,16–19 public consultation processes, and workshops,20,21
which have resulted in a Roadmap on Deforestation22 and an up-
dated communication.23 In 2019, the European Council adopted
conclusions on the main principles of future EU actions to reduce
imported deforestation resulting from EU consumption, an essen-
tial milestone in the process of the EU identifying if and how to
regulate this topic. These conclusions gave the EC a mandate
to develop policies and revise existing ones across itsmany policy
areas affecting deforestation, including, among others, con-
sumers, agriculture, development cooperation, research, trade,
and finance. These principles also provide a clear sense of direc-
tion for EU member states (MSs) considering unilateral steps
related to reducing deforestation for a particular commodity, in-
dustry, or geography. France24 and Germany25 have adopted
broad policy plans for addressing imported deforestation. In
2020, the EuropeanParliament published anown-initiative legisla-
tive report calling on the EC to take legislative action on defores-
tation,26 following up with a European added-value assessment
(EAVA) analyzing four demand-side regulatory policy options at
the EU level.27 As a follow-up to the EU communication,23 a public
consultation of potential regulatory options took place in 2020.
This will feed into an EU Impact Assessment investigating various
demand-side measures to address deforestation and forest
degradation associated with EU consumption. The impact
assessment is expected during 2021, with the eventual adoption
of a proposal for regulation taking place thereafter.
With the issue firmly set on the EU agenda, there is currently a
‘‘policy window’’28 for addressing deforestation. Still, the role of
consumer governments in reducing commodity-driven defores-
tation has so far received limited scholarly attention,29 despite
the contribution of internationally traded FRCs to overall defores-
tation.9,11 This paper aims to fill this research gap and inform the
EU policy process by identifying and analyzing policy options for
the EU and MSs to reduce tropical deforestation.
First,wemap theoptionspace forEUactionondeforestationby
compiling an extensive database of over 1,100 policy proposals
from public consultations and gray literature. Using a proponent,
instrument type, and target actor typology (see Experimental pro-
cedures and Figure 5 for details), we consolidate this database
into a smaller set of 86 unique policy options. Second, we assess
these policy options based on two key determinants of potential
policy impact: political feasibility and ‘‘theory of change’’ (TOC)
(Figure 2).
Understanding the political feasibility of policy options is
crucial for facilitating sustainability transitions.30,31 Here, we
empirically assess three different determinants of political feasi-
bility:32,33 advocacy, which measures the support for a policy
across different actors; institutional setting, which captures the
institutional complexity of defining and adopting a given policy;
and costs, which expresses the magnitude and distribution of
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Figure 2. Methodology used to identify and analyze policy options
The boxes show the different steps of the methodology, from the collection of
data on possible policy interventions from gray literature, a European Com-
mission (EC) workshop in June 2017 and the EC’s 2019 ‘‘Public Consultation
on Stepping Up EU Action against Deforestation and Forest Degradation,’’ to
classification and analyses of theories of change and political feasibility. Each
step is detailed under Experimental procedures.
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OPEN ACCESSArticleA TOC explains how and why a given policy intervention is ex-
pected to achieve change, detailing ‘‘who will do what differently
and why.’’34 A clearly elucidated TOC not only improves the
chances that an intervention affects deforestation35 by helping
‘‘identify assumptions, enabling factors and stumbling
blocks,’’34 but also builds policy legitimacy by engaging stake-
holders in a discussion on how to best achieve a given
end.35,36 Here, we draw upon theoretical and empirical evidence
to map the TOC underlying each of the identified policy options
to facilitate a discussion of the potential impact of the identified
policies on reducing imported deforestation.
By contrasting the TOC and feasibility assessments, we aim to
identify feasible and impactful policy options for the EU to reduce
deforestation. We end by discussing the implications of our find-
ings for the EU policy agenda on deforestation and propose




In reviewing the collected data, we identify 1,141 individual pol-
icy proposals put forward by the five types of proponents (Fig-
ure 3). By grouping these by target actor and policy instrument,
we summarize the individual proposals in 86 unique policy op-
tions, which are proposed anywhere from 1 to 60 times (Tables
1, 2, and 3). The most frequently proposed option is to introduce
mandatory due diligence regulation for companies importing
FRCs, followed by support for multistakeholder fora, partner-
ships, and processes; capacity building for good governance
in producer countries; and access to technology for FRC
producers.
Information-based instruments (Table 1) constitute 30% of the
86 summary options and 19% of the individual proposals, andmostly target supply-chain actors and consumer country gov-
ernments. These proposals call for research, data collection,
transparency, guidelines, and general information gathering
and sharing by actors.
Cooperative policies (Table 2) are the most commonly
proposed type across proponents, constituting 46% of the
individual proposals and 37% of the summary options. Gener-
ally, these are measures to support various actors technically,
financially, or procedurally, and except for consumers they
target actor groups equally.
At the other end,market-based policies (Table 3) are proposed
the least often across all proponents, constituting only 7% of the
individual proposals and 13% of the summary options. Pro-
posals overwhelmingly target supply-chain actors and include
the use of taxes and subsidies, import tariffs, and reforming
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Regulatory measures (Table 3) cover 28% of the individual
proposals and 21% of the summary options, with almost
half the summary options aimed at supply-chain actors and
another quarter at the financial sector. They include proposals
for due diligence and transparency regulations, application of
standards, and trade regulations. Together, market-based
and regulatory policies make up less than a third of the sum-
mary options and only slightly above a third of the individual
proposals.
Policy proponents and target actors
Of the 1,141 proposals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
propose about half (47%), knowledge institutions (19%) and
multistakeholder groups (21%) propose a fifth each, while indus-
try (8%) and public authorities (4%) provide the fewest sugges-
tions (Figure 3). Proponents make use of the four types of policy
instrument to different degrees. At one end, industry and public
authority proponents overwhelmingly provide proposals based
on cooperative instruments and very few of the other policy in-
struments. At the other end, NGOs often suggest regulatory pol-
icy options. Knowledge-based proponents are the only group
that proposes a greater-than-average number of policies relying
on market-based and regulatory instruments and fewer relying
on cooperative instruments.
Overall, supply-chain actors are the target of most policies
(about a third of both individual proposals and summary options),
followed by producer country governments and EU institutions.
However, there are differences in the types of policies targeting
different actors. Most cooperative policies are directed at pro-
ducer governments, while most voluntary, market-based, and
regulatory policies are directed at supply-chain actors.
Different proponent groups also target their proposals at
different actor groups. Knowledge institutions direct informa-
tion-based policies mostly at consumers and target EU institu-
tions more often than other proponents. Public authorities direct
information-based proposals mostly at EU actors, market-based
proposals at producers, and cooperative proposals at multilat-
eral institutions, but provide no proposals aimed at consumers
and relatively few aimed at finance and supply-chain actors. In-
dustry proponents’ proposals target upstream actors (producers
and producer governments) more often than other proponent
groups’ proposals. NGOs provide few proposals aimed at pro-




























































Figure 3. Graphical overview of the policies
proposed by different actors, the types of
policy instruments used, and the actors tar-
geted by the policy
The left section displays the different actors (NGOs,
non-governmental organizations; MULTI, multi-
stakeholder groups; KNOW, knowledge institutions;
INDUS, industry actors; and PUBL, public organi-
zations). The middle section displays the policy in-
struments applied (information-based, cooperative,
market-based, and regulatory). The right section
displays the actors targeted by the policies (PRO-
DUCER, FRC producers; PRODUCER GOV, pro-
ducer governments; CONSUM, consumers; EU
GOV, EU institutions and member states’ govern-
ments; FINANCE. financial sector actors; MULTI-S,
multistakeholder groups; M-L INST, multilateral in-
stitutions). Numbers in parentheses indicate the
total number of policy proposals for a given
category.
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OPEN ACCESS Articleand especially supply-chain actors. Multistakeholder propo-
nents provide proposals aimed at multistakeholder groups, pro-
ducers, and finance actors, but infrequently target consumers
and multilateral institutions.
Political feasibility
Tables 1, 2, and 3present the assessment of the political feasibility
of each of the 86 policy options across the three dimensions of
feasibility assessed: advocacy, institutional setting, and costs.
Overall, limitedadvocacyacrossproponentgroups is themostsig-
nificant barrier to feasibility, with 56 proposals classified as low
support, 22 as moderate, and only 8 as high support, compared
with a 3/32/51 split for institutional setting and 15/11/60 for costs.
To guide the assessment of feasibility, we divide the 86 sum-
mary options into clusters with similar combinations of feasibility
across the three dimensions. One such cluster is policies that
have an overall high level of feasibility (n = 21), defined as having
one or more high feasibility scores and no low feasibility score
across all three determinants. These can be contrasted with pol-
icies that face multiple feasibility barriers (n = 21), classified as
either medium to low across all feasibility scores or as having
at least two low scores across all three dimensions. The third
and largest cluster contains policies facing advocacy barriers
(n = 44), defined as having low feasibility score on advocacy,
but one of either (or both) cost or institutional feasibility scoring
high and the other medium (Figure S1).
The clusters are split almost entirely along policy instrument
lines. The multiple-barriers cluster almost exclusively includes
market-based and regulatory policies, such as trade policy,
e.g., negotiating VPAs (RG2); trade provisions, e.g., tariffs,
bans, quotas, sanctions, preferential access (MS1; RG1; RS4);
or amendments to existing or development of new free-trade
agreements (FTAs) (MG1) or World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules (CI1); supply-chain and finance regulations, e.g., manda-
tory labeling (RS7) or sustainability standards (RS3,5,8; RF3);
and various economic incentives, e.g., taxing deforestation in292 One Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021supply chains (MS2-3; MF1; MC1) or reforming subsidies and in-
centives in the CAP (MS4).
The two clusters of policies with high feasibility or advocacy as
the main barrier mainly consist of information-based and coop-
erative policies. The high feasibility cluster contains three over-
arching types of policies. First are policies suggesting capacity
building for FRC producers and producer countries (CP1,3;
CG1,2,6, CM1). Second are policies aimed at EU actors’ policy
development and implementation (IE1; CE1,2) and EU consump-
tion patterns (IC1; IE2). And third are policies targeting supply-
chain actors, espousing, e.g., transparency, knowledge sharing,
and certification and standards (IS1,4; CS1; CM1,2,4; CI2) and
supporting multistakeholder processes (CM3). Notably, manda-
tory supply-chain due diligence (RS1) and transparency (RS2)
policies also show high feasibility.
The advocacy-as-a-barrier cluster mainly includes policies
targeting supply-chain and, in particular, finance actors to foster
corporate sustainability practices (e.g., standards and guidelines
[IS3; IF3-4; CS2,5-6; CM5], transparency [CS3; IF1], due dili-
gence [IS6; IF2], or access to finance and technology [CS4,6;
CF1,3]). Finance sector regulation, including mandatory due dil-
igence and transparency (RF1,2) is also included in this cluster. A
separate group of policies seek to raise consumers’ awareness
(IC2-4) and provide information to various stakeholders (e.g.,
monitoring progress on public and private deforestation targets
[IG1,2; IS2]; sharing data [VE3-4], or developing labels [IS9]). Two
market-based options, results-based payments (MP1) and sub-
sidies to incentivize consumption of imperfect food (MS5) are
also in this cluster, and notably both involve subsidies, rather
than taxes or penalties.
Theories of change
Figure 4 displays the mapped TOC for each of the 86 summary
options. This mapping is largely inferred, as proponents rarely
explicate their TOCs. For example, individual policy proposals
for food waste reduction targets or CAP reform do not describe
Table 1. Political feasibility of information-based policy options, by actor targeted
Policy proposal No. A/I/C
Forest-risk commodity producers
IP1: Advocate for a reduced amount and increased environmental efficiency of FRC production 2 1/3/3
Producer governments
IG1: Identify conservation hotspots 3 1/3/3
IG2: Monitor and identify jurisdictional/national progress toward zero deforestation 2 1/3/3
IG3: ‘‘Carding’’ system with countries exporting FRCs to the EU, issuing yellow or red cards to countries failing to act
effectively to combat deforestation and illegal behavior in the supply chain
2 1/2/3
Supply-chain actors
IS1: Encourage reporting, transparency, and public disclosure and access to information 24 2/3/3
IS2: Monitor progress on corporate commitments, pledges, and initiatives for deforestation 6 1/3/3
IS3: Define industry-wide sustainability criteria, such as zero deforestation and ‘‘sustainable’’ forestry and agricultural
practices
14 1/3/3
IS4: Encourage the use of voluntary sourcing guidelines, certification, and joint/individual commitments 20 2/3/3
IS5: Encourage the use of residues, waste, and by-products and reduction of (food) waste 3 1/2/3
IS6: Promote due diligence for FRCs 1 1/3/3
IS7: Develop a blacklist of supply-chain operators not conforming to sustainability criteria 3 1/3/3
IS8: Develop a whitelist for suppliers who demonstrate and adhere to best practices for sustainability 2 1/3/3
IS9: Develop labels for origin, forest/carbon footprint, deforestation-free, etc. 12 1/2/3
Consumers
IC1: Increase citizens’ awareness to reduce consumption of meat and FRCs and promote local, vegetable-
based diets
28 2/3/3
IC2: Increase citizens’ awareness to reduce food waste 6 1/3/3
IC3: Increase citizens’ awareness to increase support for forest and climate policies 1 1/3/3
IC4: Use nudging, choice architecture, and behavioral approaches to promote sustainable consumption 4 1/3/3
EU governments
IE1: Increase knowledge, research, and data collection 31 3/3/3
IE2: Promote sustainability criteria in public procurement and dietary guidelines 14 2/3/3
IE3: Increase transparency, information, and sharing of public data on land use and deforestation 10 1/3/3
IE4: Provide information and transparency on trade agreements 2 1/2/3




IF1: Encourage traceability and transparency of financial flows involved in commodity production, trade, and
consumption, e.g., using monitoring and reporting tools
6 1/3/3
IF2: Encourage due diligence for financial institutions 2 1/3/3
IF3: Encourage voluntary commitments on sustainability standards by financial actors 7 1/3/3
IF4: Provide guidelines, standards, or labels on sustainable or responsible investment, divestment, or green financial
products
10 1/3/3
Summary policy options classified as information-based, by actor targeted. Numbers (No.) indicate the number of times each policy option was pro-
posed in our sample. The political feasibility assessment is displayed (1, low; 2, medium; 3, high feasibility) for the three determinants: advocacy (A),
institutional setting (I), and cost (C).
ll
OPEN ACCESSArticlewhat actions to implement and how this would reduce defores-
tation. Also, some proposals seem to conflate means (e.g., in-
crease transparency) with ends (i.e., reducing deforestation),
thus providing normative statements as policies.
Overall, three-quarters of both individual proposals and sum-
mary options rely on reduced demand for forest land as a means
of reducing deforestation. Only a tenth aims to reduce defores-
tation by protecting existing forests. To some extent, this finding
is expected, as tropical forest protection is not within the purviewof EU policy, while factors influencing the demand for land for
FRC production are. Finally, for about an eighth of the policies,
it is unclear how their implementation would reduce deforesta-
tion, as the stated policy means’ ability to address the desired
ends can be only vaguely or indirectly inferred.
Our mapping indicates three overall TOCs for reducing the de-
mand for new forest land for FRC production: reducing overall
demand for FRCs, increasing the demand for deforestation-
free FRCs, and increasing the supply of deforestation-freeOne Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021 293
Table 2. Political feasibility of cooperative policy options, by actor targeted
Policy proposal No. A/I/C
Forest-risk commodity producers
CP1: Provide access to technology, technical support, and training for better practices, sustainable intensification,
climate-smart agriculture, and sustainable forest management
43 3/3/3
CP2: Provide access to finance and credit lines 8 1/3/3
CP3: Support alternative livelihoods and production systems 18 2/3/3
CP4: Support and scale-up cooperation, conflict resolution, and community monitoring 5 1/3/3
Producer governments
CG1: Support capacity building for good governance, policy coordination, and enforcement of existing laws and
regulations
59 3/3/2
CG2: Support forest conservation and restoration through technical capacity building, monitoring, research and data
collection, etc.
36 3/3/3
CG3: Support sustainable agriculture in producer countries through technical capacity building (e.g., through official
development assistance [ODA])
13 1/3/3
CG4: Support tax and tariff reform in exporting countries to promote sustainable production of FRCs 6 1/3/2
CG5: Make ODA and other financial support mechanisms conditional on sustainable production and deforestation
targets
3 1/3/2




CS1: Support uptake and implementation of existing production standards (e.g., sustainability criteria, certification,
zero deforestation)
22 2/3/3
CS2: Support the development of new guidelines, criteria, standards, and roadmaps 8 1/3/3
CS3: Support for traceability and transparency 6 1/3/3
CS4: Support and improve access to finance for alternative business models, product service systems, and sharing
platforms
8 1/3/3
CS5: Support the uptake of and compliance with procurement policies and other sourcing guidelines 4 1/3/3
CS6: Support industry commitments through technical capacity building for monitoring, data collection, etc. 8 1/3/3
EU governments
CE1: Mainstream deforestation concerns in EU policies and promote synergy between policy areas 32 3/2/3
CE2: Improve implementation of existing EU policies (e.g., FLEGT, RED I and II) related to deforestation 21 2/3/3
CE3: Formulate and implement an EU action plan (on deforestation, sustainable agriculture) 8 1/3/3
CE4: Strengthen institutional capacity and cross-ministerial cooperation 11 1/2/3
Finance actors
CF1: Support the development of a responsible investment framework (e.g., environmental, social, and governance
[ESG] criteria) and mechanisms for internal monitoring and external compliance
3 1/3/3
CF2: Support innovative financial mechanisms for sustainable production, including blending instruments and public-
private, results-based, and up-front financing
14 2/3/3
CF3: Provide insurance, guarantees, and reinsurance mechanisms to de-risk investments in sustainable land use 9 1/3/3
Multistakeholder
CM1: Promote dialogue and cooperation with other producer and consumer countries 29 3/3/3
CM2: Alignment and harmonization of international, national and private-sector definitions, targets and commitments 9 2/3/3
CM3: Support multistakeholder fora, partnerships, and processes (jurisdictional or commodity roundtables,
moratoria, etc.)
61 3/3/3
CM4: Facilitate data collection and information sharing among stakeholders 15 2/3/3




CI1: Support reform of World Trade Organization rules based on sustainability considerations 4 1/3/1
CI2: Support implementation of existing commitments, treaties, and initiatives (e.g., Paris Agreement, REDD+,
Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD])
12 2/2/1
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2. Continued
Policy proposal No. A/I/C
CI3: Support additional sustainability efforts within multilateral institutions (e.g., World Bank, UN) 12 1/2/3
CI4: Support development of binding international treaties and regulations on business and sustainability 6 1/2/3
Summary policy options classified as cooperative, by actor targeted. Numbers (No.) indicate the number of times each policy option was proposed in
our sample. The political feasibility assessment is displayed (1, low; 2, medium; 3, high feasibility) for the three determinants: advocacy (A), institutional
setting (I), and cost (C).
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OPEN ACCESSArticleFRCs. Reducing overall demand is the least prevalent of these
TOCs. It is proposed to be achieved by limiting the EU bioenergy
demand (RS6), shifting from meat to vegetable-based diets
(IC1,4), reducing food waste (IC2; IS5; MS5), and reforming the
EU CAP (MS4). However, the specific causal mechanisms for
decreasing deforestation are seldom explicated.
The distinction between the TOCs aiming to increase, respec-
tively, demand or supply for deforestation-free FRCs—consti-
tuting 30%–40% of all policy proposals each—is not always
clear-cut. For example, proposals for supporting multistake-
holder processes (CM3), developing new standards and certifi-
cations (CS2), or increasing the uptake of existing ones (CS1),
may work to increase either supply or demand of deforesta-
tion-free FRCs.
Proposals to improve farmers’ capacity (CP1-3) or the system in
which they operate (CG1,6; CP4) have more evident TOCs. For
example,promotingalternativeproductionsystems, training, tech-
nical assistance, and access to finance, or establishing good
governance, ensuring land rights, or resolving local conflictsclearly
aim to reduce deforestation by promoting the supply of deforesta-
tion-free FRCs. The same holds for policies seeking to ensure that
investments are not directed to deforestation-related production.
Other policies aim to increase the demand for deforestation-
free FRCs through different channels. A large group of policies
aims to increase information or awareness on deforestation,
e.g., through transparency (IS1; RS2; IF1; FR1; CS3), blacklists
and whitelists (IS7,8), or monitoring capacity (IS2; CS6; IE1,3),
with the (largely implicit) assumption that this will cause changes
in corporate practices and consumer behavior. There are also
suggestions for more directly shifting FRC consumption patterns,
e.g., through sustainability criteria for public procurement (IE2;
RE2) or by trade measures of various degrees of scope and strin-
gency, such as negotiating VPAs (RG2), applying sustainability
trade provisions (tariffs, bans, quotas, sanctions, preferential ac-
cess) (MS1), or amending existing FTAs or WTO rules (RG1;
CI1). Included here is also the popular option to use due diligence
(RS1; IS6) to hold importers accountable for actions in their supply
chain to increase demand for deforestation-free FRCs.
Most policies seeking to reduce deforestation by protecting
existing forests do so by increasing capacity among local au-
thorities and stakeholders, through technical and financial assis-
tance (CG1-2; CP4). These policies espouse good governance
and enforcement of laws; various forms of technical support,
e.g., forest monitoring; and initiating funds to finance forest pro-
tection. Another set of policies provides financial incentives to
preserve forests, either by directly paying landowners for forest
conservation (MP1) (similar to or directly referring to REDD+) or
by making development assistance to exporters of FRCs contin-
gent on halting deforestation (CG5).Although the TOCs displayed in Figure 4 outline ‘‘who would
do what differently,’’ they do not always clearly elucidate
‘‘why,’’ partly because this is not always explicated in the policy
proposals, and partly because there are sometimes different an-
swers to that question. For example, the uptake of certifications,
standards, transparency, and due diligence can be either sup-
ported or mandated. The difference between how these TOCs
are realized has implications for their validity and eventual impact
on reducing imported deforestation, which we discuss below.DISCUSSION
The lack of clearly elucidated TOCs for most policy proposals is
striking. Still, our attempt to infer underlying TOCs should be re-
garded as only a first step in informing the EU policy debate on
reducing imported deforestation. As stressed by Garcia
et al.,35 TOCs need to be constantly revisited in ‘‘a dynamic pro-
cess, [where] the TOC can support the collective testing of as-
sumptions.’’ This idea articulates a need to deepen the defores-
tation policy debate to enable informed discussions on how to
design optimal policies. Here, it is critical to draw on the exten-
sive evidence produced on drivers of tropical deforesta-
tion,9,37–39 addressing both the underlying drivers (e.g., con-
sumption, technology) and the proximate causes (e.g.,
agricultural expansion, logging). Drawing upon empirical and
theoretical literature, we discuss the inferred TOCs, with an
eye to the relation between potential impact and our assessment
of political feasibility.Reducing deforestation by shifting EU FRC demand
Several TOCs rely on information to shift demand—both inter-
mediate and final—either away from imported FRCs completely,
e.g., through diet shifts (IC1), or to sustainably produced FRCs,
e.g., through voluntary or mandatory supply-chain transparency
(IS1, RS2). Overall, these suggestions show high feasibility,
though advocacy is a potential barrier for some information-
based policies (e.g., IS1-2,7-8; IC3; IF1; RS2). However, the
assumed causal link between information provision and impact
is questionable: information-based policies are highly depen-
dent on context and phrasing,40,41 necessitating careful design
to achieve change. ‘‘Nudging’’ and behavioral designs (IC4)
address this issue, but are yet be proven impactful on a large
scale.42 Gardner et al.43 also caution that increased supply-
chain transparency can be used strategically by strong actors
to strengthen their position or increase information fatigue. Infor-
mation overload is already an issue for consumers44 and there is
strong empirical evidence that information alone does not shift
consumption patterns.45 Negative information typically hasOne Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021 295
Table 3. Political feasibility of market-based policy options (top, M) and regulatory policy options (bottom, R), by actor targeted
Policy proposal No. A/I/C
Forest-risk commodity producers
MP1: Use results-based payments (e.g., carbon and ecosystem services markets such as REDD+, EU emissions
trading scheme, verified emissions reductions) to promote sustainable production
11 1/2/3
Supply-chain actors
MS1: Lower/raise import tariffs for sustainably/unsustainably produced commodities 14 2/2/1
MS2: Reform economic incentives (e.g., taxes and subsidies) for FRCs based on sustainability impacts 28 2/2/1
MS3: Introduce carbon pricing along the supply chain, including deforestation for FRCs 2 1/1/1
MS4: Reform EU CAP to reduce imported deforestation and promote sustainable agricultural production 18 2/2/1
MS5: Introduce subsidies for ‘‘imperfect’’ food products to reduce food waste 2 1/2/3
Consumers
MC1: Introduce consumer taxes that reflect environmental impacts (e.g., deforestation, carbon emissions) 5 1/3/1
EU governments
ME1: Environmental tax revenues for actions to reduce deforestation 1 1/3/1
Finance actors
MF1: Introduce a tax on investment in companies linked to deforestation 1 1/2/2
MF2: Subsidize investments in sustainable/deforestation-free projects 1 1/2/2
Producer governments
RG1: Include sustainability criteria and complaint mechanisms in current and future trade agreements 32 2/1/1
RG2: Negotiate partnership agreements (e.g., FLEGT-like VPAs) with producer countries 25 1/1/2
Supply-chain actors
RS1: Mandatory due diligence regulation for companies importing FRCs 60 3/2/2
RS2: Mandatory transparency and reporting requirements 19 2/3/3
RS3: Mandatory regulatory standards (e.g., sustainability criteria, certification, high carbon stock [HCS]/high
conservation value [HCV] approach)
28 2/2/1
RS4: Regulate imports, e.g., through quotas, bans, or preferential access agreements 21 2/2/1
RS5: Apply sanctions or prosecute companies not adhering to sustainability criteria 8 1/2/1
RS6: Limit EU bioenergy demand and strengthen sustainability criteria on bioenergy 30 2/2/1
RS7: Mandatory labeling of origin, forest/carbon footprint, deforestation-free, storage, etc. 6 1/2/2
RS8: Extend sustainability criteria for bioenergy to non-energy uses of the same commodities 6 1/2/1
EU governments
RE1: Include land use and deforestation in the product environmental footprint regulation 1 1/2/3
RE2: Sustainability criteria and targets in public procurement policies 29 2/2/2
RE3: Review or amend EU competition law to allow businesses greater freedom to collaborate for sustainability
purposes
2 1/2/3
RE4: Introduce food waste reduction goals and regulations 3 1/3/1
Finance actors
RF1: Mandatory transparency and deforestation proofing for investments in agricultural and forestry supply chains 12 1/2/3
RF2: Mandatory due diligence requirements for EU financial institutions 9 1/2/3
RF3: Introduce regulation standards and criteria that ensure that finance from EU operators does not contribute to
deforestation
19 1/2/2
RF4: Divest public funds from companies linked to deforestation and/or increase investments in sustainable
consumption
4 1/3/2
Summary policy options classified as market-based (top) or regulatory (bottom), by actor targeted. Numbers (No.) indicate the number of times each
policy option was proposed in our sample. The political feasibility assessment is displayed (1, low; 2, medium; 3, high feasibility) for the three deter-
minants: advocacy (A), institutional setting (I), and cost (C).
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OPEN ACCESS Articlebroader impacts on consumer choices,46,47 but requires manda-
tory labeling (RS7), which shows scant support in our data.
Another way to realize demand shifts is by pricing deforesta-
tion embodied in FRC products (or their associated carbon emis-296 One Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021sions) (MS1-2). These proposals face several feasibility barriers
and are likely to have limited impact on deforestation, at least if
implemented as consumption taxes. Carbon taxation of food
shows relatively modest consumption changes due to low
Deforestation in PEF [RE1] to...
Competition law revision [RE3] to...
Dialogue with other producer and consumer countries [CM1] to…




Carbon pricing along supply-chain [MS3] to…
Consumer taxes reflecting impact [MC1] to…
…increase use of residues 
/reduce food waste [IS5] to...
Introduce food waste regulations [RE4] to…
Subsidies for imperfect food [MS5] to…
Increase citizens’ awareness [IC1-2] to...
Reduce EU bioenergy demand [RS6] to…
Use existing criteria, certifications, standards [IS4, RS3, RS5, CS1, CM2] to...
Develop new criteria, certifications, standards [RS7-8, CM5, CS2, IS3, VS9] to...
Supplier Blacklist [IS7] or Whitelist [IS8] to...
Technical capacity building for monitoring, data collection for industry [CS6] to...
Reform economic incentives, e.g., taxes & subsidies [MS2] to…
Reform CAP [MS4] to…
Sustainable trade criteria [RG1], tariffs [MS1], quotas, preferential access [RS4]
to...
Negotiate partnership agreements [RG2] to...
Reform WTO rules [CI1] to...
‘Carding’ system [IG3] to ...
Information and transparency on trade agreements [IE4] to ...
...ensure sustainable trade
to...
Financial due diligence [IF2, RF2] to...
Transp. financial transactions [RF1, IF1] to…
Guidelines, standards, certifications [CF1, RF3, IF3-4] for sustainable
investments to...
Use investment taxes/subsidies [MF1-2] or divestment [RF4] to...
De-risk sustainable investments [CF3] to...
Innovative financial mechanisms [CF2] and alt. business models [CS4] to...
Provide technical assistance [CP1; CG3], finance [CP2], support alternative
livelihoods [CP3] to...
Tax & tariff reform in prod. count. [CG4] to…







Supply chain due diligence [RS1, IS6] to...
Transp. supply-chains [RS2, IS1, CS3] to…
…hold actors accountable to…











available to consumers and/or 
supply-chain actors to...
…shift relative prices of
FRCs/non-FRCs to...
















Multi-stakeholder fora [CM3] to…
...support supply-chain actors 





…shift consumption patterns 
to...
Results-based payments [MP1] to…
Use capacity building (good governance, policy implementation) [CG1] & 
community cooperation [CP4] to...
Support implementation of existing commitments [CI2], additional sustainability
efforts [CI3] & legally binding treaties [CI4] in multilateral fora to...
Mainstream [CE1], implement [CE2], build institutional capacity [CE4] on
existing EU policies to...
EU Action Plan [CE3] to...
Increase public commitments on [IE5], and support for [IC3], forest & climate
policy to…
Provide technical capacity, monitoring, research & data collection [CG2] to...
…create economic incentive
for farmers/ governments to…
…improve the institutional












Conditional ODA [CG5] to…
Earmark env. tax revenues [ME1] to...
Research and data collection [IE1], sharing [IE3, CM4], monitoring [IS2, IG2],
conservation hotspots [IG1] to…
(legend on next page)
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OPEN ACCESS Articledemand elasticities.48,49 As most FRCs are intermediate inputs
to processed products (e.g., palm oil, soybeans, rubber, wood
products), consumer price changes are comparatively lower,
making FRC taxes more effective if levied on supply-chain ac-
tors. Importantly, to have an impact, tax levels on FRCs must
be differentiated by the relative contribution to deforestation,
which complicates implementation and raises information needs
tremendously.
Reforming CAP regulations50,51 (MS4), which include market-
and trade-distorting provisions such as import tariffs and sector
aid,16,52 could address deforestation by incentivizing increased
EU production of FRC substitutes, primarily livestock feed, but
also vegetable-based protein to substitute for meat. However,
reforming the CAP is institutionally complex53,54 and faces
strong opposition from some actors, making this a difficult op-
tion for reducing FRC demand.
Trade measures (MS1; RG1-2; RS4; CI1) provide an obvious
avenue for addressing FRC imports, but these options face sub-
stantial feasibility barriers. Amending existing trade measures to
consider deforestation—e.g., reducing tariffs for deforestation-
free agricultural commodities16,55—could ease feasibility con-
cerns, but show limited impact due to the low tariffs onmost agri-
cultural products. There are critical legal and financial con-
straints to generally applied, stringent trade measures on
FRCs, such as tariff increases, sanctions, and bans, imposed
by WTO rules and existing EU law.55 Including strict sustainabil-
ity criteria in FTAs (RG1) can reduce deforestation, but the cur-
rent Mercosur agreement illustrates the difficulty of utilizing this
option.56,57 Similarly, negotiating FLEGT-style VPAs for FRCs
(RG2) would enable the EU to target forest governance and pro-
duction practices in tropical countries, but the cumbersome
negotiation process and slow implementation58 provides a bar-
rier to near-term impacts. However, VPAs could be attractive
in cases where the EU constitutes the main trading partner,
e.g., for cocoa from West Africa.
Trade-based discrimination can be implemented under
certain conditions.59,60 For example, the Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Regulation61 applies a scheme
to ‘‘validate’’ products entering the EU market and impose
bans on imports (RS4, RG1), if exporters fail to implement
required reforms promptly. It also operates a ‘‘carding system’’
for countries—similar to IG3—to incentivize cooperation and
governance reforms.62 The similarities between IUU-related is-
sues and deforestation make it obvious to draw on this policy.
However, in addition to low feasibility, the geographically limited
production of some FRCs, e.g., palm and cocoa, provides a bar-
rier to redlists and import bans by reducing the number of trading
partners available, while leakage remains an issue.63
Reducing deforestation using supply-chain
interventions
Our results clearly illustrate an increased focus on supply-chain
sustainability interventions as a critical component of reducing
deforestation, reflected also in the zero-deforestation commit-Figure 4. Visualization of the theories of change (TOCs) underlying the
The boxes indicate the explicit or inferred actions and outcomes linking the policy
lines denote the causal links between these. The thickness of the lines denotes t
options are mentioned in brackets, e.g., [RS6], referring to the specific policy op
298 One Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021ments made by a growing number of companies.7,64,65 Notably,
using new or existing standards and certifications (IS3-4; IF3-4;
CS1-2,5; CM5) to drive change among FRC producers, supply-
chain actors, and financial institutions collectively accounts for
the largest share of policy proposals. There is some empirical ev-
idence that certification improves sustainability outcomes at the
farm level,66,67 including farm tree cover.68–71 However, overall
impacts on deforestation have been limited by certification le-
niency and insufficient market uptake.72–75 At present, demand
for certified products trails supply for most FRCs.76 To reduce
deforestation, a viable TOC needs to explicate how stringent
standards would move from niche to mainstream, overcoming
the fundamental trade-off between impact and uptake for volun-
tary standards.77,78 Our analysis suggests this will be difficult, as
proposals for making standards mandatory (RS3,7-8) face mul-
tiple feasibility barriers.
Multistakeholder processes (CM3) can foster synergies
between policies and is a strongly supported, high-feasibility op-
tion. Although there is limited empirical evidence of how interac-
tions between private and public governance regimes affect
conservation policy,67 incipient evidence shows that sector-
wide standards resulting from multistakeholder dialogues—
such as the Brazilian Soy Moratorium79—can reduce deforesta-
tion, especially when combined with government support.64 As
illustrated by the soy moratorium, the impact of multistakeholder
interventions depends on their ability to establish clear and strin-
gent rules on deforestation and implement monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms to ensure accountability,79 even in
the absence of supportive public governance frameworks. How-
ever, leakages risk undermining the overall impact of multistake-
holder interventions by displacing deforestation to other terri-
tories,80–83 companies with less reputational risk,84 or
commodities (e.g., beef) with lower frontier entry costs.85,86
Due diligence requirements introduce accountability provi-
sions for supply-chain actors (RS1, IS6) and are the most com-
mon proposal in our sample, receiving widespread support
across proponents. The support for mandatory adoption is
crucial to achieving impact, as a recent evaluation found that
‘‘voluntary measures have not been effective in encouraging
companies to identify, account and mitigate negative human
rights and environmental impacts in their supply chains.’’87
Although mandatory due diligence regulation faces moderate
feasibility barriers on institutional setting and costs, the
EUTR88 and Conflict Minerals89 Regulations both apply due dil-
igence and transparency measures, providing precedence that
these barriers are surmountable.
Due diligence was included in the European Parliament’s
EAVA report,27 and the European Commission is expected to
introduce a legislative proposal for mandatory human rights
and environmental due diligence for EU companies in 2021. As
the 2020 UK due diligence consultation90 illustrates, the require-
ments and sanctions placed on key actors, such as large traders
and producer groups, and the commodities included, affect
overall impact. The French ‘‘duty of care’’ law (Loi de Vigilance)86 identified policy options
options (left) and the goal of reducing deforestation (right), while the horizontal
he number of policy proposals relying on the specific TOC. The specific policy
tions. For details about specific policy options, see Tables 1, 2, and 3.
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Although it does not focus on a specific sector or issue, it in-
cludes a civil liability regime,91 holding companies accountable
for breaches of the regulation.
Proposals for due diligence and increased transparency in
finance (VF1-2; RF1-2) typically exhibit lower support (especially
from industry and public authorities). Evidence from the Brazilian
Amazon suggests that environmental criteria for restricting rural
credit can effectively reduce deforestation.92 This measure,
together with evidence of substantial ownership by EU-based
financial actors and foreign investment flows into FRC opera-
tions, e.g., in the Amazon,93,94 suggests that including the
finance sector in prospective EU regulations can reduce defor-
estation rates beyond that embodied in EU imports of FRCs.
Within the EU process, options for regulating the financial sector
include introducing investment standards for deforestation
(RF3), taking broader action on environmental, social, and gover-
nance criteria in the financial sector (VF3; CF2-3), and imple-
menting a sustainable finance taxonomy (CF1; VF4).
Reducing deforestation by supporting FRC producers
Although most policy options identified target actors within the
EU, some prevalent TOCs target actors in producer countries.
First, these include supporting FRC producers—financially
(CP2; CS4; CF2), technically (CP1,3; CG3), or with regard to
regulation (CP4; CG4,6)—to shift production practices and in-
crease deforestation-free FRC production. Although these pol-
icies exhibit high feasibility, the causal links between support
for FRC producers and reduced deforestation are far from
straightforward and highly context dependent. There is ample
evidence that ‘‘trade-offs andwin-lose between forest conserva-
tion and technological progress in agriculture in areas near for-
ests appear to be the rule rather than the exception’’ (p. 9)95
This implies that supporting sustainable intensification may not
have an impact on deforestation, especially if driven by demand
for FRCs traded on global markets. Empirical evidence on the
TOC for increased tenure security (CG6) is also mixed, gener-
ating increased or decreased deforestation depending on
context,96–100 although interventions can reduce deforestation,
if well designed. However, these policies risk creating stronger
incentives for forest clearing for producers supplying interna-
tional markets.
Options focusing on capacity building for FRC producer gov-
ernments (CG1-2,4) have a lot in commonwith what has become
the reality of REDD. However, direct references to REDD is sur-
prisingly scant in the sampled data. This gap probably reflects a
shift in the debate from government-led conservation policies
promoted under REDD to supply-chain sustainability interven-
tions and private sector action. Although exhibiting high feasi-
bility overall, there is mixed empirical evidence of REDD policies
reducing deforestation,101,102 although they have reduced defor-
estation in specific cases.103 Martius et al.34 argue that one
reason for the failure of REDD to produce tangible reductions
in deforestation is precisely the lack of—or different conceptions
of—a TOC. REDDwas initially conceived as a system to leverage
international carbon markets to compensate tropical countries
for reducing deforestation, but has evolved into a mostly aid-
funded program with multiple objectives beyond forest conser-
vation, where payments are seldom conditional on out-comes.101,104–106 This suggests that moving toward the original
REDD idea of conditional payments could increase impact.105
However, there are also multiple challenges in implementing
this (including feasibility), regardless of whether it is through re-
sults-based payment programs targeting farmers (MP1)107 or
making development aid conditional (CG5).104
Resolving the feasibility-impact dilemma
The discussion above suggests a potential trade-off between
feasibility and ability to directly address deforestation: the
most feasible policy options—such as increased information,
voluntary certification and standards, or technical capacity
building—typically have relatively weak TOCs, while proposals
with more viable TOCs (i.e., TOCs supported by both theoretical
and empirical evidence)—mandatory certification and stan-
dards, trade measures, and supply-chain and finance regula-
tions—appear less politically feasible. The apparent disjoint
confirms the common perception of a trade-off between political
feasibility and stringency (and assumed impact) in environmental
policy interventions.30
One way to overcome this dilemma is through policy mix-
ing:30,108,109 combining policy options with varying cost, sup-
port, and institutional structure—and thus different implications
for affected stakeholders—to create synergy that both increases
stakeholder acceptance and improves overall impact.67 Existing
examples of policy mixing include private zero-deforestation ini-
tiatives and public policy support,64 REDD efforts and FLEGT
VPAs in producer countries,110 or combinations of costly and
beneficial food policies.30
Designing optimal policy mixes requires identifying the ‘‘low-
hanging fruits,’’ i.e., feasible policy proposals building on viable
and proven TOCs, while finding ways to overcome the feasibility
barriers that make policies with convincing TOCs currently un-
feasible. This includes actions that increase support (e.g., mixing
‘‘carrots’’ and ‘‘sticks’’)111 or reduce costs or complexity (e.g.,
limiting the FRCs included in the policy) to overcome resistance
from key stakeholders. This also suggests that the assessment
of feasibility and impact of individual policy interventions pro-
vided here must be complemented by studies on how policy
mixing affects overall feasibility and impact.109
From a policy-mixing perspective, support to producer coun-
tries can help legitimize more stringent interventions, by estab-
lishing the foundations on which such interventions rest. As
such, broader support to producer country governments for bet-
ter governance and tenure reform,112 and adequate access to
technical support, training, finance, etc., are important prerequi-
sites for demand-side interventions.34,113 Existing EU policies,
e.g., FLEGT and the IUU andMinerals Regulations, already apply
collaborative efforts with producer countries as part of stronger,
demand-side action. Supporting producer countries can also
facilitate the successful implementation of industry supply-chain
and jurisdictional initiatives currently ongoing in producer re-
gions,64,65 making private-sector actors more supportive of
such interventions. Note, however, the importance of including
marginalized (e.g., smallholders or indigenous communities)
groups in such deliberations, to ensure that they are not sidelined
in the process.114,115
EU’s deforestation footprint arises from imports of just a hand-
ful of FRCs (Figure 1), so targeting these likely makes the mostOne Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021 299
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increases the legitimacy of policy action. Working with key FRC
producer countries also avoids the pitfall of good actors leaving
bad places, resulting in deforestation risks merely shifting to less
scrupulous traders, importers, and consumers. However, such a
narrow policy approach is less resilient to changes in deforesta-
tion drivers, across commodities or countries, over time.
Analyzing the ‘‘stickiness’’ of supply chains116 provides an op-
tion for mitigating this risk. Gradually extending regulations to
other FRCs and regions over time, a process known as ‘‘policy
sequencing,’’117 and coordinating efforts with other consumer
countries procuring large quantities of FRCs118 can mitigate
the risk of deforestation leakage to other commodities or re-
gions. Finally, the low feasibility of most options to reduce FRC
demand highlights that many stakeholders perceive it as unde-
sirable to interfere with consumer choice, possibly due to ques-
tions of agency,119 the direct perceptibility of such measures,30
or fears of tackling their own base.
Our results also illustrate that policy support must be
analyzed in a broader context than public acceptability alone.30
Industry, knowledge institutions, and multistakeholder groups
play a central role in formulating and advocating for policy op-
tions, emphasizing the need to understand opposition and sup-
port from these stakeholders as a critical component of political
feasibility. The development of the EUTR shows that mutual in-
terests and alliances between NGOs and industry groups are
conducive to the development of regulatory interventions,
with policy change resulting from ‘‘competition and collabora-
tion among coalitions.’’120 Similar coalitions exist for deforesta-
tion action, e.g., in the cocoa sector, where prominent industry
actors and NGOs jointly voiced support for mandatory due dil-
igence regulation,121 and in the European oil palm industry.122
In the United Kingdom, 22 companies recently urged the gov-
ernment to strengthen and tighten the proposed due diligence
requirements for FRCs.123 Identifying and working with such
coalitions is crucial to ensuring broad policy support and build-
ing legitimacy.
Building on our analysis, we suggest three principles for miti-
gating the apparent trade-off between feasibility and impact in
EU deforestation policy:
i. Implement policies based on clearly elucidated and proven
TOCs. Policy makers should employ policies proven to be
successful in reducing imported deforestation—e.g., multi-
stakeholder action enforced through strict account-
ability,79,124 restrictions on credit,92 and VPAs125—and tailor
policy design to the context, as the drivers of deforesta-
tion—and thereby the most optimal policy response—are
affected by location, commodity production system, forest
type, and socioeconomic and cultural context-dependent
factors.37,126
ii. Use policy mixes to create synergies and increase impact.
Understanding how different policy options complement
and reinforce one another is critical for maximizing policy
impact on deforestation, a perspective that is largely
missing from existing policy proposals.
iii. Work with stakeholders in key supply chains and regions,
broadening scope over time. Broad political and financial
support in both producer and consumer countries is neces-300 One Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021sary to build the foundation for strong policy action and
effective implementation of deforestation policies.
Sequencing policies and gradually expanding scope over
time can facilitate acceptance and reduce risks of leakage.
Conclusion
From a sample of 1,141 policy proposals, we identified 86 unique
policy options for the EU to reduce imported deforestation. Most
of these build on information-based and cooperative measures,
while market-based and regulatory options are less favored. Pol-
icies overwhelmingly target supply-chain actors, with due dili-
gence, transparency, and certifications as preferred policy op-
tions. Our feasibility assessment shows advocacy as a main
barrier across policy types, with institutional and cost barriers
mainly affecting market-based and regulatory policy options.
On the other hand, policies exhibiting high political feasibility
typically lack a clear TOC for how the specific intervention con-
tributes to the reduction of deforestation, suggesting a trade-off
between political feasibility and policy impact. Still, there are pol-
icies, which our analysis suggests are both politically feasible
and able to reduce imported deforestation, in particular, manda-
tory due diligence for supply-chain (and finance) actors and in-
terventions supported through multistakeholder processes.
These and other policies identified here should be considered
by EU and national policy makers. Building on the analysis and
policies identified here and applying the three principles can
help policy makers introduce policies with greater impact on




Further information and requests for resources should be directed to and will
be fulfilled by the lead contact, Simon L. Bager at simon.bager@uclouvain.be,
simonbager@gmail.com.
Material availability
This study did not generate new unique materials.
Data and code availability
The dataset used for this paper has been uploaded to the Zenodo data repos-
itory, where it is freely available (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4443032).
Identifying EU policies for reducing deforestation
To identify EU policy options to address deforestation, we followed a three-
pronged approach. First, we reviewed gray literature sources to identify policy
options presented by various stakeholders for addressing land use changes
and deforestation. We applied a snowballing approach to identify reports
and policy briefs by NGOs, business associations and industries, consul-
tancies and knowledge institutions, and public entities since the publication
of the first EU Plan for Deforestation (2008–2019). Second, we reviewed the
suggestions presented during a 2-day workshop held in Brussels in June
2017 as part of the ‘‘EU Action Plan to address drivers of deforestation’’
project. Last, we reviewed submissions to the European Commission’s ‘‘Pub-
lic Consultation on Stepping up EU Action against Deforestation and Forest
Degradation,’’ open in the period January 12 to February 25, 2019,20 excluding
submissions by individual citizens. We did not include peer-reviewed articles,
as the process for publication of scientific research differ substantially from
that of other reports, which allow stakeholders to voice their ‘‘opinion’’ on a
given topic.
We note that the proposals from the European Commission’s public consul-
tation and workshop do not necessarily come from a representative sample of
actors, as not all stakeholders have the means to participate in such events. It
is, for example, likely that indigenous groups and stakeholders without a
















Figure 5. Identification and interaction of
target actors for deforestation policy options
Actors of relevance to commodity-driven defores-
tation are displayed in green boxes of different
shades and the arrows denote the links between
these. FRC producers are producers of forest-risk
commodities (FRCs), e.g., loggers, cattle ranchers,
and farmers. Producer country governments
include national and sub-national governments and
agencies in countries subject to deforestation.
Supply-chain actors across the FRC supply chains
include, for example, slaughterhouses, oil palm
mills, soy traders, feed producers, consumer goods
companies, retailers, and other actors connecting
the producers of FRCs to the final consumers.
Consumers of FRCs include private individuals and
public entities, both within the EU and outside. EU
governments include both joint EU institutions (e.g.,
the EC Directorates-General, the European Council,
and the Committee of the Regions) and MSs’ gov-
ernments and institutions, including ministries,
agencies, and sub-national and regional govern-
ments. Finance actors include private and public entities, such as banks, investors, insurance companies, asset managers, and pension funds. Multistakeholder
actors include multistakeholder arenas, such as commodity roundtables and multistakeholder organizations. Multilateral institutions include international and
supranational organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.
ll
OPEN ACCESSArticlepresence in Brussels or the EU are underrepresented in our sample. However,
this is balanced by the gray literature review, which makes up the bulk of our
data material. We also acknowledge that the sampling does not directly take
into account large-scale advocacy campaigns and boycotts orchestrated by
civil society to raise awareness of a particular issue, including deforestation.
Such advocacy campaigns can play a role in shaping political awareness of
deforestation127,128 and thus affect feasibility. Our assessment indirectly cap-
tures this, as it features publications by prominent civil society organizations,
which often refer to related campaigns.
For all sources, we restricted the search to policy options for public, con-
sumer country (e.g., EU) interventions, excluding options for producer country
governments or private-sector actors. This sampling strategy resulted in 907
policy options from the literature and the workshop, and 234 suggestions
from the public consultation. We classified each option as being proposed
by one of five proponent groups: (1) NGOs, (2) industry, (3) knowledge institu-
tions (e.g., academic institutions or think tanks), (4) public authorities (e.g.,
ministries, agencies), or (5) multistakeholder organizations (or multiproponent
submissions).
Classifying target actors and policy instruments
We classified each of the 1,141 identified policy proposals based on two attri-
butes: the actor targeted and the type of policy instrument proposed. This
classification primarily serves a heuristic purpose, allowing us to group pro-
posals in themes (actor-instrument combinations) andmaking it easier to sum-
marize them in a smaller set of unique, non-overlapping policy options. How-
ever, this classification also facilitates an analysis of differences in the types of
policies proposed by different actors—informing the policy feasibility assess-
ment—as well as a discussion on the TOC underlying each proposal.
For the classification of actors targeted by the intervention, we distinguished
between eight different groups of actors (Figure 5). Producers (and sometimes
producer-country governments) represent the proximate (direct) drivers of
deforestation, e.g., through agriculture, forestry, and infrastructure activ-
ities.7,37 Other actors jointly shape the underlying economic, institutional, de-
mographic, and technological drivers that affect deforestation: consumers
create the demand for FRCs, which supply-chain actors meet, sometimes
enabled by finance actors who provide credit to actors along supply chains.93
Producer governments set the regulatory environments that enable or restrict
deforestation. They use legislation, monitoring, and enforcement of land use
and forest conservation policies.38 Consumer-country governments (e.g.,
the EU), in contrast, shape the regulatory space that consumers and supply-
chain operators operate in. Finally, multistakeholder actors enable interaction
between different actors, e.g., facilitating roundtables, fora, or joint organiza-tions, while multilateral institutions, among other things, affect cross-national
conduct of business.
Policy instruments are the tools by which regulators implement policies.
They can be classified by the means with which policy makers seek to change
the behavior of the actor targeted by the policy. A classical definition distin-
guishes between ‘‘sticks’’ (regulation), ‘‘carrots’’ (incentives), and ‘‘sermons’’
(information).111 However, various classifications, mainly from public policy
literature, include additional categories, e.g., ‘‘planning,’’ ‘‘cooperative,’’129
‘‘partnering,’’ and ‘‘hybrid,’’130 to accommodate the specific policy process
of various sectors (Table S1). For example, in the context of forest governance,
Gupta et al.131 include ‘‘management’’ to account for processes in the field.
Beyond sector-specific issues, instruments rely on different mechanisms to
‘‘influence collective action as a means of realizing political objectives’’ (p.
14)132 and thus vary in the degree of state/legislator intervention required.
Further, as noted by Agrawal et al.,133 different instruments require ‘‘varying
forms and levels of resources to be adopted and implemented,’’ which means
that some instruments are more costly (economically or technically) than
others. To classify the policy instrument espoused by various proposals, we
draw on these typologies to distinguish between four broad types of policy in-
struments, each of which relies on different mechanisms to affect actor
behavior: (1) information-based, (2) cooperative, (3) market-based, and (4) reg-
ulatory policies (Table S2).
We divided thework of classifying policies on target actors and policy instru-
ment types between ourselves. However, the results were cross-checked and
classification disagreements resolved. We excluded from further analysis pol-
icy options that were too unclear, vague, or incoherently expressed to be
assigned to an actor and a policy type. We summarized the remaining 1,141
policy suggestions into unique policy suggestions by each actor-instrument
combination (83 4).We grouped together similar policy interventions targeting
different commodities (e.g., due diligence). Two of us (S.L.B. and U.M.P.)
jointly carried out this grouping process, resulting in 86 unique policy options
for the EU to address deforestation.
Assessing political feasibility
A policy suggestion must be feasible to implement and likely to affect change
to have an impact on the EU’s contribution to deforestation, but assessing po-
litical feasibility and policy impact ex ante is fraught with difficulties. Assessing
these two aspects is highly dependent on policy-specific design factors. For
example, policy scope, i.e., geographical, temporal and sectorial, and policy
stringency, understood as the relative internalization of environmental exter-
nalities compared with the counterfactual, affects both feasibility and impact,
yet depends on policy-specific design factors. This also includes selectingOne Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021 301
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and ‘‘deforestation.’’ Further, the specific context (e.g., political, cultural, his-
torical, and technological) in which the policy is implemented also shapes pol-
icy outcomes.117,134,135 However, there are determinants of political feasibility
and policy impact that are independent of these design and contextual factors.
Although there are hard constraints (e.g., laws of nature or logic) that rule out
infeasible policy proposals, most policy constraints are soft (or malleable) and
by their nature contextual. Thus, to ask if a policy proposal is feasible requires
specifying feasible for whom, where, and when?136,137 Here, we assumed that
the acting agent (whom) is an EU institution or MS, acting either individually or
jointly to implement EU policies to address deforestation embodied in FRC
trade (where). We further assumed that the context (when) is near-term action
(pre-2030), implying that we would take institutional arrangements (formal and
informal) and sociotechnical constraints to be more or less fixed. Although re-
laxing social, regulatory, or institutional constraints could have an impact on
future feasibility of EU action on deforestation, we left this issue aside for future
analyses.
To compare political feasibility across different policy options, we assessed
three different determinants of feasibility:32,33 ‘‘advocacy,’’ i.e., actors sup-
porting a given policy option; ‘‘institutional setting,’’ i.e., the institutional rules
for defining and adopting a given policy; and ‘‘costs,’’ i.e., magnitude and dis-
tribution of societal costs resulting from policy implementation. For all summa-
rized policy options, we awarded a score (low, medium, high feasibility) for
each of the three determinants, according to the following (mostly qualitative)
criteria (Table S3).
Advocacy
We assessed advocacy by quantifying the support for a given policy option
among and across different proponents in our sample. The more widespread
support was—measured as the strength of support for a policy across different
proponent types—the higher its advocacy score. We acknowledge that this
measure of policy support is crude; it measures only support of, not opposition
to, a policy and does not account for differences in political clout between ac-
tors, for example. As such, the measure highlights where there is broad posi-
tive support for a given policy proposal, as it is not based on stated policy pref-
erences among all actors.
Institutional setting
Institutional setting aims to capture the procedural and technical constraints of
policy making, including defining and implementing the policy. We used the
institutional involvement required by different actors during policy develop-
ment and implementation to assess the institutional setting. The capacities
required to design a policy and the political institutions able to define and
implement it differ across policy options. In one form, a policy might be insti-
tutionally complex, while only minor adjustments to the policy can reduce
the complexity significantly, and vice versa. Defining institutional setting in-
volves subjective judgment and is reflective of the scope and context, yet, it
remains an important metric to gauge the political feasibility of a policy.
Monetary costs
We took a qualitative approach to assessing policy cost, assuming that the
impact that cost has on feasibility can be proxied by the type of costs a policy
incurs and the magnitude of the cost streams affected by the policy. These
include not only direct costs (costs for implementing or complying with the pol-
icy), but also indirect societal costs (e.g., impacts on prices of goods and ser-
vices, or increased transaction costs).138 Policies incurring only direct costs
are more likely to be feasible than policies having potentially high indirect
(economy-wide) costs, unless these direct costs are very substantial. The
larger the monetary streams affected, the more likely it is that the policy will
incur high indirect (economy-wide) costs. Moreover, higher absolute costs
also risk having larger distributive effects, thus affecting political feasibility
(cf. Jewell and Cherp31). Similarly, while some policies may be societally effi-
cient (e.g., through potential double-dividend effects), they can incur consider-
able political resistance due to their redistributive effects on the economy.
Theory of change
Devising an optimal strategy for reducing imported deforestation requires
an understanding of how different interventions lead to a reduction in
deforestation—i.e., the causal chain through which the specific policy
should reduce tropical deforestation—what is often called a theory of
change. As illustrated by Martius et al.34 for the case of REDD, TOCs are302 One Earth 4, 289–306, February 19, 2021often implicit, and different actors may have different conceptions of the
TOC for a given intervention. To infer TOCs for our identified policy pro-
posals (where they are not explicated in the data material), we drew
upon on the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on what drives
and stops tropical deforestation.37,139,140 The starting point for this TOC
mapping was the notion that there are two main ways in which commod-
ity-driven deforestation can be reduced: (1) by protecting forests (analo-
gous to increasing the forest conservation rent)140 and (2) by reducing
the demand for forest land for FRC production (analogous to reducing
the rent of extensive agriculture).140 We further identified three main sub-
categories for reducing the demand for forest land: (2a) by reducing overall
demand for FRCs, (2b) by increasing the demand for deforestation-free
FRC production, or (2c) by increasing the supply of deforestation-free
FRCs. By drawing up our classification of policy type and actor targeted,
we were able to group policies based on the different ways in which they
adhere to the specific strategies for achieving reductions in deforestation.
We also identified policy options that did not clearly work through one of
the two main ways of reducing deforestation. Mapping the TOC for defor-
estation was done for the 86 different policy options. The thickness of the
line connecting the different boxes in Figure 4 corresponds to the number
of proposals working through the given TOC, allowing us to identify the
main TOCs proposed by the various stakeholders.
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